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ABSTRACT: The article aims to reveal the features of how the ideas of the end of history and 
post-history influence the contemporary political process. The adherents to the concept of the 
end of history, while considering the collapse of authoritarianism and totalitarianism and 
withdrawal of any alternatives to liberalism from the historical scene, ignore the deep crisis of 
the liberal ideology and liberal-democratic regimes. The main fallacy of the end of history and 
post-history concept, which exists in the public consciousness, is the confusion of the sense of 
the end of history and the impasse of historical development with the completion of historical 
development. The way out of this situation is developing the paradigm of linear historical 
development, which can adequately respond to the current political crisis, rather than claiming 
the end of history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the late 20th century, the ideas of end of history and the humanity entering 
the post-historical era became frequent. For a while, these two ideas were 
subject to active discussion among scholars and even covered in newspapers 
and journals. Nowadays, at first glance, they seem to recede far into the 
background. For this reason, one may see all that was of a temporary interest, 
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the ideas are out of fashion now and have fell into oblivion. However, it is a 
deceptive impression.  
One should assume that the notion of the end of history or at least that of 
the deadlock state the humanity has entered are deeply rooted in the 
contemporary public consciousness. It should be highlighted that it is 
comprehending the uncertainty of the situation we are in rather than the 
negative influence of the theories of the end of history or post-history (though it 
played a certain role) that made it possible.  
This uncertainty is dangerous especially present in the political process that 
eventually defines the direction for public development. In this respect, the 
philosophy should aim at revelling the onset and background of a theory rather 
than overthrowing it. In the view of philosophical analysis, the nature of 
paradigm sets formed by post-historical ideas concerning political process 
triggers particular interest within current article.  
This article aims to reveal the peculiarities of how the ideas of the end of 
history and post-history affect the contemporary political process.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The concepts of the end of history and post-history are neither the results of 
someone’s task-specific propaganda nor the fruits of some philosophizing 
intellectuals’ imagination that ran wild. They result from comprehending real 
tendencies incident to the contemporary political process. Along with that, they 
represent metaphysical (in the traditional sense) one-dimensional perceptions of 
contradictory characteristics of the contemporary political processes.  
The idea of the end of history was always present in linear concepts of 
philosophy and history, for example, in the studies by Hegel, Marx, Jaspers, 
etc. Nevertheless, it was Francis Fukuyama (1992) who first transferred this idea 
from exclusively philosophical and historical dimension to political philosophy. 
He defined the competition of political ideologies as a content of historical 
process. In his opinion, as it was the liberal ideology, which has no serious 
alternatives hereafter, that won in the ideological struggle, the historical process 
is complete.  
Very few scholars share his conclusion about the end of history. However, 
his statement about the victory of the liberal ideology was indirectly – if not 
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directly – supported by many. It can be confirmed by existing conclusions 
about the integration of modern ideologies mainly based on liberal values 
(Dalton, Welzel, 2014), the transition of political struggle from strategic 
problems to daily, routine tasks (Dalton, Welzel, 2014; Grant, 2001), universal 
recognition of liberal rights and liberties (Akram, Marsh, McCaffrie, 2014; 
Kimlicka, 2014; Richards, Smith, 2014), etc.  
But the majority of researchers, including the adherents to post-history 
concept, evaluate the contemporary political process in the opposite way. The 
concept of the end of history was subject to most severe criticism by Jacques 
Derrida, who qualified Fukuyama’s work as ‘new testament rhetoric’: he 
considered frivolous the apology for the triumph of the capitalism or economic 
and political liberalism, that for ‘universalization of the Western liberal 
democracy as the final point of human government, ‘the end to the problem of 
class antagonism’. ‘What cynicism of “pure consciousness” what intellectual 
blindness can make one write, and even believe, that “all the hurdles to 
reciprocal recognition of human dignity are overcome and buried in history 
once and for all”’ (Derrida, 2006: 118). Besides, Derrida (2000) convincingly 
demonstrated that the peculiar feature of modernity is the end of the political 
rather than the triumph of democracy. It would be legitimate to mention as 
well the theorists of multiculturalism admitting that the contemporary liberal 
democracy requires significant corrections (Grant, 2001; Guo, Wong, 2015; 
Wieviorka, 2014). 
It is slightly more complicated concerning the theory of post-history. It is 
also evoked by the contemporary political process, but by its crisis 
manifestations. Firstly, its adherents stress that currently there is no political 
ideology capable of addressing all the critical problems of modernity. 
According to Derrida, ‘A set of transformations of all sorts (in particular, 
techno-scientifico-economico-media) exceeds both the traditional givens of the 
Marxist discourse and those of the liberal discourse opposed to it. Even if we 
have inherited some essential resources for projecting their analysis, we must 
first recognize that these mutations perturb the onto-theological schemas or the 
philosophies of technics as such. They disturb political philosophies and the 
common concepts of democracy, they oblige us to reconsider all relations 
between State and nation, man and citizen, the private and the public, and so 
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forth’ (Derrida, 2006: 103). Secondly, they prove that the peculiarity of the 
contemporary society is the increasing political indifference (Baudrillard, 2000). 
On their parallel ways to the conclusions of the theory of post-history were 
also social and humanitarian sciences. Originally, the linear understanding of 
historical process was based on the philosophical studies by Hegel, Marx and 
other thinkers of the Modern History. It implied the human ability to 
comprehend the meaning and orientation of historical process. However, as 
soon as in the late 19th century, neo-Kantianism, neo-Hegelianism, 
neopositivism and postpositivism as well as many others questioned this ability. 
And indeed empirical historians initiated the transition from macro- to micro-
history. Therefore, as Franklin Ankersmit reasonably underlines, the transition 
from speculative philosophy of history to historism and then to postmodern 
philosophy of history, i.e. post-history, is a fairly consistent outcome 
(Ankersmit, 2003: 424). 
Invidious postmodern conclusions about the wreck of ‘Enlightenment 
Project’ were most substantially grounded by Jürgen Habermas (2003). His 
criticism of post-historical views on political process was supported by 
adherents to both anti-multicultalism (Joppke, 2004; Malik, 2015) and liberal 
ideology (Akram, Marsh, McCaffrie, 2014; Dalton, Welzel, 2014; Thomassen, 
2015). 
This notwithstanding, the criticism of both the theory of the end of history 
and that of post-history seem one-dimensional. In other words, revealing their 
theoretic and methodological drawbacks critics fail to pay enough attention to 
certain legitimacy of their argument. Therefore, this research attempts to 
conduct a dialectical analysis of these theories.  
METHODS 
In the contemporary science the concepts of ‘the end of history’ and ‘post-
history’ have two interpretations. The first of them – within linear philosophy – 
implies that ‘the end of history’ means the termination of historical 
development of humankind, while ‘post-history’ (‘post-historical society’) is the 
name of the final stage. In particular, this is how they are understood in the 
famous Francis Fukuyama’s concept (1990). The second interpretation, which 
derives from postmodern philosophy, ‘the end of history’ and ‘post-history’ 
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mean that previous understanding of the historical process becomes a thing of 
the past. In order to prevent confusion, this article understands the end of 
history according to the first definition and refers the second one to post-
history. 
The theories of the end of history and post-history are sure to affect public 
consciousness in various ways. Therefore, it should be taken into consideration 
in the course of studying the influence of post-historical ideas on the 
contemporary public consciousness. Taking this circumstance into account is 
possible due to the application of comparative analysis.  
Along with that, the peculiar feature of the contemporary time is a curious 
combination of the ideas of the end of history and post-history that exists in 
public consciousness in many countries. In other words, researching the 
influence of post-historical ideas on the contemporary political process implies 
separate consideration of how both ideas affect practice, while public 
consciousness should be considered as something synthesized from these both 
theories. The consideration of these both circumstances is only possible relying 
upon analysis, synthesis and a system method.  
The problem of correlation between social theories and political practice is 
most completely solved through dialectical method. In particular, it implies that 
social theories reflect fundamental tendencies of political practice, but they also 
significantly influence its course.  
It should be noted that the ideas of the end of history is nothing new – it 
was present in all linear concepts of philosophy of history. It functioned as a 
kind of historical orienting point, then, in Fukuyama’s concept, it obtains 
another meaning and turns into a kind of starting point. Therefore, this 
research applies historical method to take into account historical variability of 
methodological and worldview-related (axiological) dimensions of the concept 
of the end of history.   
Lastly, it should be clarified that this article understands the end of history 
according to Fukuyama’s interpretation. As for ‘post-history’, there is no 
consonance concerning its definition in postmodern philosophy, thus the main 
reference is made to Jean Baudrillard’s interpretation.  
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LIBERALISM, THE SOCIAL, THE INDIVIDUAL: POST-HISTORY VERSUS 
THE END OF HISTORY 
The main Fukuyama’s argument in favour of the end of history is the collapse 
of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, the oblivion of all the alternatives to 
liberalism, and ‘final’ establishment of liberal ideology in public consciousness 
of the humankind. It is very hard to object to the first part of the argument, 
while the second one is completely unacceptable. The point is that Fukuyama 
did not pay attention to the fact that liberalism (both as ideology and as 
practice) was also involved in severe crisis. In this regard, modernism seems 
more consistent declaring ‘decline’ of modernist metanarratives in general, 
including universal ideologies. 
It is mainly agreed that the contemporary democracy faces serious crisis. All 
the manifestations of the crisis can be divided into two groups based on their 
temporal dimension. In other words, it is the crisis of democracy today and that 
in the future.  
The crisis of democracy today is primarily manifested in the decline in 
confidence in contemporary democratic institutions. For instance, according to 
Richards and Smith (2014), the proportion of those who had ‘almost never’ 
believed that the British government prioritized social needs over political 
interests increased from 10% in 1974 up to 40% in 2009. Akram, Marsh, 
McCaffrie (2014) draw attention to the widespread drop in political 
participation in developed liberal countries. Although the authors specify the 
emergence of new forms of political participation, the crisis of traditional forms 
is obvious. Thus, in the post-war Great Britain about 80% of population took 
part in general election, while in the early 21st century this figure accounted for 
only 50-60%. According to Akram, Marsh, McCaffrie (2014), Armingeon, 
Guthmann (2014), and Thomassen (2015), party membership fell by half or 
more in France, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Ireland compared 
to the 1980s.  
In this regard, one even concludes that in developed democratic countries a 
devoted, loyal citizen is being substituted by a new assertive one as a type of 
political culture (Dalton, Welzel, 2014). The previous political culture was 
characterized by high confidence in institutions, high participation in election 
and other conventional forms of legitimate activities. A new political culture is 
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characterized by low confidence in institutions and the participation in non-
violent activity that is provocative towards elites. On the one hand, the new 
culture bearers are adherent to democracy, on the other hand, they are 
unsatisfied with the realization (implementation) of democracy in their country 
(Ibidem).  
It should be underlined that the crisis began back in the 1960s. The 
research conducted then demonstrated the same data. Thus, the group of 
scholars led by Dalton (2002) reported that the proportion of strong party 
adherents declined by 26% in Great Britain; in Sweden, Austria and Australia 
– by 15%; in Norway – by 9% and in the USA – by 7% (Ibid., 262-263). Webb, 
Farrell, Holliday (2002) conducted similar research and revealed the same data 
in all the 16 Western democracies under study, which means that it is 
impossibile to deny the weakening of public support for political parties in the 
majority of Western democracies. In Canada, the number of people confident 
in political parties declined from 30% in 1979 to 11% in 1996 and in Germany – 
from 43% in 1979 to 26% in 1993 (Dalton, Wattenberg, 2002: 28).  
An ideology should conform not only to the present but also to the future. 
In other words, it should be capable of solving possible perspective problems. If 
looking at the problem under study through this lens, the prospects of 
liberalism are far from being positive. Dahl (1989) convincingly demonstrated 
that modern liberal democratic system may function efficiently only in a 
nation-state. However, nowadays, as a result of globalization, nation-states are 
becoming a thing of the past and national identity is diffusing, i.e. the 
foundations of liberal democracy are being demolished.  
In this respect, the ability of liberal ideology to extrapolate its values and 
practices to new social relations assumes significance. In this regard, it is sure 
that the most serious challenge for liberalism is multiculturalism. Some prove 
that it represents a new stage of liberal development, is consistent, getting 
widespread, and takes roots (Kimlicka, 2014; Guo, Wong, 2015; Wieviorka, 
2014), others claim its failure and that it mines the foundations of liberalism 
(Joppke, 2004; Malik, 2015). Although there is no consonance concerning the 
achievements of multiculturalism, the fact that liberalism has to solve this 
problem is undeniable.  If one manages to insert the provisions of 
multiculturalism into liberal ideology, it may safely be said that it will not be the 
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same (i.e. current) liberalism.  
Fukuyama does not mention anything concerning these manifestations of 
crisis that the contemporary liberal democracy is involved in. Acknowledging 
that the contemporary democracy faces a large number of problems, he refers 
to drug abuse, homelessness, criminality, ecological catastrophes, and 
thoughtless consumerism. He states that ‘these problems fail to be obviously 
insolvable based on the liberal principals and are not so grave to be sure to lead 
to the wreck of society as a whole – the wreck similar to that communism 
experienced in the late 1980s’ (Fukuyama, 2004: 23). 
As there not yet exist any proper solutions to these problems, it is untimely 
to claim that one has found the optimal ideology. In this respect, the theory of 
the end of history has extremely negative influence on the solution to the stated 
problems, creating an illusion of solving all the critical problems and 
channeling ideological struggle in the wrong direction. Sure enough that 
historical process is infinite, applying the terms used by Karl Popper (2013), and 
represents a sequence of shifts from a less perfect ideology to a more perfect 
one. 
Unlike the adherents to the end of history, their counterparts supporting the 
theory of post-history bring the crisis of the contemporary democracy to the 
forefront rather than turn a blind eye to it. In particular, Baudrillard explicitly 
states, ‘the only genuine problem today is the silence of the mass, the silence of 
the silent majority’ (Baudrillard, 2000: 30).  
One has to agree with him that such political indifference should not be 
explained through the manipulation of consciousness, although it should not be 
completely ignored either. Baudrillard explains the indifference of the masses 
through being ontologically inherent in them: ‘this indifference of the masses is 
their true, their only practice, that there is no other ideal of them to imagine, 
nothing in this to deplore, but everything to analyse as the brute fact of a 
collective retaliation and of a refusal to participate in the recommended ideals, 
however enlightened. Nevertheless, this is the very thing that makes the masses 
be what they are’ (Baudrillard, 2000: 20). 
According to Baudrillard (2000), the Modern History saw the “rise and fall 
of the political”. He states that the political and the social were inseparable 
since the French Revolution. The political manifested the social, with the latter 
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becoming its content. However, the emergence of Marxism initiated the 
hegemony of the social and the economic, with the political converting to its 
reflection. Having expelled the political and become omnipresent, now the 
social backfired; it suffered the same fate as the political: ‘...the social itself no 
longer has any name. Anonymous. THE MASS. THE MASSES’ (Baudrillard, 
2000: 25). 
Baudrillard interprets the social as a feature that is only inherent to 
modernist society. However, now ‘chaotic’ society replaces that with fixed 
structure and relations. Baudrillard states: ‘the social has well and truly existed, 
but does not exist any more’ (Baudrillard, 2000: 91). Along with the social, the 
political is also becoming a thing of the past. 
There is a need to dwell on two key problems that Baudrillard raised, 
namely, the end of the social and the nature of the masses. He understands 
both definitions (‘the social’ and ‘the masses’) in a specific way.  
Conventionally, social relations are defined as those that people establish in 
the course of reproduction of social being. Such understanding of social 
relations exists in any society, while, according to Baudrillard, the social exists 
only in modernist society. Is such understanding of the social is legitimate? 
On the one hand, no one would question the specific features of social 
relations in modernist society. Baudrillard attached great importance to the 
temporal factor, stressing the sustainability and stability of social relations.   
On the other hand, when accelerating and changing quite rapidly, do they 
stop being social? Yes, sure, in its classical meaning. Indeed, social relations 
change more rapidly than one can comprehend it and develop a strategy for 
adaptation, let alone the inability to foresee and, certainly, to regulate them. 
Nevertheless, in their conventional meaning, social relations still exist. 
Consequently, a point should be made about new means to comprehend and 
regulate social relations. 
 In this respect, the explanation of the specific feature of postmodern social 
relations, which the adherents to the theory of post-industrial society suggested, 
seems more substantial. In particular, concerning the transformation of 
education, Alvin Toffler stated, ‘in static societies, the past is slow to merge with 
the present and repeat itself in the future. In such a society, the most sensible 
way to educate a child is to teach them the competence of the past’ (Toffler, 
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1997: 325). The industrial education of the masses focused on (1) teaching well-
known skills and (2) making a person disciplined. However, this system becomes 
obsolete in the post-industrial society. If knowledge gets out of date quickly, 
there is no need to remember it. In post-industrial society, ‘education should 
train people to function in temporary organization of tomorrow’ (Ibid., 323). 
Conventionally, the term “the masses’ refers to atomized and alienated 
individuals. Such individuals are known to appear during the decomposition of 
traditional society and establishment of industrial one. These processes make 
some people left outside the system of traditional relations trying to find a new 
one. Therefore, such an individual seeks to connect with those of their kind and 
blend into the society of such individuals. José Ortega y Gasset noted, ‘The 
mass is all that which sets no value on itself—good or ill—based on specific 
grounds, but which feels itself “just like everybody,” and nevertheless is not 
concerned about it; is, in fact, quite happy to feel itself as one with everybody 
else’ (Ortega y Gasset, 1989: 121). Erich Fromm made a legitimate comment 
that one of the main mechanisms of ‘escape from freedom’ is a transformation 
of person into an ‘automaton’: ‘the individual ceases to be himself; he adopts 
entirely the kind of personality offered to him by cultural patterns; and he 
therefore becomes exactly as all others are and as they expect him to be. The 
discrepancy between “I” and the world disappears and with it the conscious 
fear of aloneness and powerlessness’ (Fromm, 1990:  159).  
It would be quite appropriate to stress that Baudrillard’s statement about 
the masses generally contradicts the postmodernist idea of a fragmented world, 
society and subject. The fragmentation of society means that a single social 
environment is torn into separate pieces, with every individual being isolated in 
their own little world. Such an individual does not seek to blend into society, 
nor become similar to others, but, conversely, they try to stand out from the 
society, to become nothing like the others. 
This contradiction is likely to be triggered by the following circumstance. 
On the one hand, postmodernists had an intuitive feeling of an unusual type of 
society being established. On the other hand, different representatives of 
postmodernism prioritize various characteristics of this society. What is that 
new society like? 
Social sciences provide the knowledge that in the infancy of mankind, 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 302 
people lived in communities (that sometimes called ‘Gemeinschaft’). This 
community was based on ‘natural’, tribal relations. Then, it has been 
substituted by society in its modern meaning, i.e. based on rational relations 
(defined as ‘Gesellschaft’). This society is where a nation is formed, i.e. 
individuals who realize their interests and rationally regulate their relationships.  
However, the transition from community to society can trigger the 
emergence of the masses, i.e., as said, individuals who seek to blend into a 
community of their kind. In post-industrial society, it is not unexpected that 
individuals increasingly focus on satisfying their personal needs. Such society 
makes an impression of being a mass, in the sense that all the people are 
involved in solving their personal problems in similar way. They are no longer 
a nation determined to pursue collective interests. However, it is not a mass 
society in its traditional meaning as individuals act separately. Baudrillard pays 
attention only to one feature of a new society – the unwillingness of individuals 
to concern themselves about common problems. Along with this, he is right 
that the establishing society is strikingly different from the former, industrial 
society and requires deep research.  
There is no doubt that there are many factors that cause this political 
indifference of the masses, with the delegitimization of the institutions of 
modern democracy being considered a major factor. These institutions were 
meant for solving the problems of the development of the modernist society, so 
they do not correspond with further development of the post-industrial one. 
This problem clashes into a fundamental issue of orientation points for further 
development of a society. Besides, researchers are both concerned (Kutyryov, 
2016; Omelchenko, 2017) and optimist (Mattern, Floerkemeier, 2016; Santucci, 
2016) about the opportunities of further scientific and technical progress to 
influence social relations and a human. 
Neither the concept of the end of history nor that of post-history contribute 
to the solution of the stated issue. Their main drawback is excessive influence of 
determinism. This is a paradox, especially for post-modernism, as claiming the 
end to metanarratives (universal theories) (Chotchaeva, Sosnovskii, 2017: 179), it 
implicitly proposes a new one. It can be said that it is the metanarratives of the 
past, not metanarratives in general, that have become obsolete.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The concepts of both the end of history and post-history manifest the 
contradictory nature of the political processes that run nowadays.  Along with 
that, they are one-dimensional expression of various tendencies. The concept of 
the end of history expresses such features of the contemporary political process 
as the end of ideological struggle, the priority of short-term factors over long-
term ones, worldwide spread of liberal values and practices. The concept of 
post-history expresses such features of the contemporary political process as the 
crisis of democratic institutions and the decline in political participation. Both 
concepts mix the ideas of the termination of historical process and that of (real) 
historical process itself in the public consciousness. 
The concepts of both the end of history and post-history have reverse 
influence on the contemporary political process. The concept of the end of 
history, while substantiating the end of political and ideological struggles, drives 
away from the comprehension of increasing fundamental contradictions of 
modern society. The concept of post-history, while substantiating the end of the 
political, creates the wrong idea about the insoluble social and political 
contradictions. 
The main fallacy of the concepts of the end of history and that of post-
history is the interpretation of the feeling of the end of history and the 
deadlocked state of the historical progress formed in public consciousness as the 
termination of historical development. Stressing this aspect of the situation, the 
theories inadvertently worsen it.  
The way to overcome current state of affairs is to avoid claiming the end of 
history and work out the paradigm of linear historical development able to 
become a new political ideology that would adequately respond to the political 
crisis. That said, suggesting working out a linear paradigm, no single option of 
development should be claimed as the only possibility considering the 
contemporary methodology (synergy).  
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